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1
Translated from the German by G. M. Goshgarian
Philology, the 'love of the word', is an academic discipline that threatens to turn the texts 
collected in critical editions into intellectual playgrounds. For the important task that consists 
in trying to arrive at as coherent an understanding of a text as possible by considering 
everything its author has written always trails a certain danger in its wake: it can all too easily 
become an academic exercise in textual criticism and commentary. When what is at stake is 
critical social theory, this variant on 'art for art's sake' is especially risky: it can transform 
scientific critique into contemplative scholarship. That said, critical social theories must also, 
in view of the rich textual corpus now at our disposal, run the risks of philology.
Marx's oeuvre offers philologists several different avenues of attack. Thus it has not 
only appeared in different editions (in Germany, both the MEW—Marx-Engels-Werke, as well 
as the second edition of the  MEGA,  Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe), but also in divergent 
translations across the globe. Moreover, it presents us with an open-ended theory that, if 
Althusser is right, can be broken down into different stages. Even the last of them, according 
to Althusser, attempts to formulate a critique of political economy that is not always 
theoretically coherent, and is on the whole extremely complex (cf. Althusser 1996, 27). As for 
the propagandistic simplification and textual canonisation that state socialism inflicted on 
Marx, it certainly did his work no service. The upshot is that there is no body of critical social 
theory that stands more to gain from discriminating philology than Marx's.
Confronted,   however,   with   such  variegated,   ambiguous,   and  manipulated   texts, 
philological criticism must bring theoretical and political criteria to bear if it is neither to 
degenerate into an activity pursued for its own sake nor lose sight of what Marx actually 
wrote.
2 Such criteria will also provide the kind of interpretive framework that is the sine qua 
1  Jan Hoff,  Kritik der klassischen politischen Ökonomie: Zur Rezeption der werttheoretischen Ansätze 
ökonomischen Klassiker durch Karl Marx. Cologne: Papy Rossa, 2004.
2 This is not to say that capriciously manipulation of Marx's texts cannot have productive effects as well. 
Recently, Lucien Sève has again drawn attention to the fact that Althusser's reception of Marx must be regarded 
as a 'reading  without reading' (Sève 2004, 26). Althusser, who, as a reader of Marx, 'displayed an often 
impressive critical perspicacity, literally failed to read them' (ibid., 31). Thus Sève highlights Althusser's claim 
that the concept of alienation has disappeared 'without a trace' (ibid., 27) from  Capital  (while noting that 










































Author manuscript, published in "Science & Society 72, 4 (2008) 402-414"non for a coherent understanding of Marx. Given the scope and richness of his work, it is only 
natural to seek one such criterion in its chronological development, that is, the theoretical 
progress that Marx is supposed to have made as his thought unfolded, the assumption being 
that later texts offer a more mature critique of political economy than their predecessors. With 
regard to, say, the relationship between the  1844 Manuscripts  and Volume I of  Capital, 
published over twenty years later, this assumption is hardly debatable. On the other hand, 
there is good reason to ask whether  Capital  represents a higher stage in the critique of 
political economy than any and all of Marx's earlier texts. For the fact is that his critique 
developed in extremely uneven, precarious fashion over the course of his career. 
The way Marx introduces the capital form of value in Volume I of his magnum opus is a 
case in point. After having developed the categories of commodity, money, and exchange in 
Part One of  Capital, he begins Part Two by affirming that, besides the form of simple 
commodity exchange, C-M-C, 'we find. . . another, specifically different form, M-C-M, the 
transformation of money into commodities, and the change of commodities back again into 
money, or buying in order to sell' (Marx 1975, vol. 35). That one simply 'finds' the capital 
form suggests that there is an external, contingent relationship between capital and simple 
circulation as analysed in Part One. This interpretation has its origins in Engels' lapse, the 
concept of 'simple commodity production'. 
Marx's collaborator commits it, for example, in a review of 'A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy' and in the preface and afterword to Volume III of Capital, 
which he edited and brought out after Marx's death. In these texts, Engels sets up a parallel 
between the historical beginnings of economic development and the point of departure for 
theoretical reflection on capitalist society (in Marx: simple circulation as 'an abstract sphere of 
the total process of bourgeois production', MEGA² II.2, 68). He contends that the 'further 
progress' of the theory 'will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent 
form, of the historical course ... [a] ... corrected reflection ... [but] corrected in accordance 
with laws provided by the actual historical course' (Engels, Review). The logical process of 
the development of categories is in Marx, according to Engels, 'a historical process, and its 
explanatory reflection in thought, the logical pursuance of its inner connections' (Engels, 
Althusser's thesis as to the 'tendential disappearance' (ibid., 29) of the concept of alienation in the critique of 
political economy neglects the Grundrisse, which, he maintains, the author of For Marx never read, aside from 
the introduction. Nonetheless, according to Sève, Althusser's lucid distinction between the different problematics 
of the early and the mature Marx is hardly open to doubt. As Sève sees it, then, we are confronted with the fact 
that 'one of the most powerful twentieth-century readings of Marx, an undeniably stimulating reading whose 









































9Supplement). Engels takes as his premise the notion that there was a historical period in 
which money and commodities existed without capital: 'the Marxian law of value holds 
generally, as far as economic laws are valid at all, for the whole period of simple commodity 
production–that is, up to the time when the latter suffers a modification through the 
appearance of the capitalist form of production' (ibid.). The political consequence of this 
dissolution of the conceptual bond between commodities, money, and capital is that Engels 
takes simple commodity production as the model for not only the pre-capitalist, but also the 
post-capitalist period. In Anti-Dühring, he affirms that society, too, from the moment it 'enters 
into possession of the means of production and uses them in direct association for production' 
(Engels, Anti-Dühring), must know 'how much labour each article of consumption requires 
for its production' (ibid.). In short, the political goal is the realization, at last, of freedom and 
equality, that is to say, equal exchange. The sole difference is that, for Engels, equal exchange 
will not be based on private property.
Engels' thesis is problematic for several reasons. One is historical:
Of course, exchange took place thousands of years ago, too, and coined money has been in existence since 
500 B.C., if not before. Commodity relations and monetary relations were, however, always 'embedded' in 
other kinds of productive relations; they were never pervasive, and never dominated the economy. That came 
about only with the generalization of the capitalist mode of production (Heinrich 2004, 78).
Simple commodity production is an equally questionable concept from a theoretical 
point of view, since it 'ignores the intentions of Marx's theory of value at the level of 
monetary theory' (Backhaus 1997, 131). What is more, Engels' interpretation is tantamount to 
the affirmation (encouraged, as has already been suggested, by Marx's conception of the 
theory of value in Volume I of Capital) that there can be commodity production without 
capital. It is thus based on a form of capitalist economy which appears not as a sovereign 
relation of production, but, rather, as constituted by acts of buying and selling.
Marx's conception is at variance with Engels'. Thus he seeks, in texts written a scant 
ten years before Volume I saw the light (the  Grundrisse  and the first version of  A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy), to deduce the category of capital from the 
characteristics of simple circulation. The starting point for this deduction is money. As 
money, value possesses, it is true, an autonomous form, but its autonomy is 'mere appearance' 
(MEGA² II.2, 67). Outside the circulation process, it is 'pure illusion' (ibid., 64), 'as worthless 
as if it had been left lying at the bottom of a mine shaft' (ibid., 74). However, when money 
circulates, it becomes a commodity. Value thereby loses its autonomous form and is 









































9Grundrisse, about the initially abstract condition for the effective autonomisation of value, 
that '[money's] very entry into circulation must be a moment of its staying at home 
[Beisichbleiben], and its staying at home must be an entry into circulation. Exchange value, 
therefore, is now characterized as a process' (Marx 1973, translation modified).
3 It can thus be 
seen that a theoretically adequate understanding of Marx's categories and their interrelation is 
possible, at least with respect to this point, only on a reading that does not automatically 
equate the chronological development of his work with an unbroken process of theoretical 
maturation. Moreover, as the example of Engels' notion of a post-capitalist commodity 
production has already shown, Marxian philology of the kind that hews strictly to the order in 
which Marx's texts were produced is suspect for political reasons as well. Thus, if the relation 
between simple circulation and capital is an external one, the market and capital can be played 
off against each other – with, no mistake about it, Engels' help – almost as if they were 
mutually antagonistic forces. (After 1989/1990, many people on the left did precisely that; 
bourgeois theorists always have, idealizing simple circulation as an economic Garden of 
Eden.) The corresponding political conception can then seem plausible: namely, that the 
power of big corporations should be limited so as to clear a path for the allegedly beneficial 
effects of the market (cf. Heinrich 2004, 80).
4 A certain kind of philology might well take off 
from here.
Jan Hoff chooses not to begin his philological examination of Marx's reading of 
classical theories of value with an explicit discussion of the criteria he will be using. His 
general orientation is, however, based on the 'monetary theory of value in the late Marx's 
critique of political economy' (p. 12). 'Monetary theory of value' usually evokes, in German-
speaking countries, an approach to Marx that has developed out of the work of Hans-Georg 
Backhaus over the last thirty years or so; its guiding assumption is that the Marxist theory of 
value 'is conceived as a critique of pre-monetary theories of value' and 'is essentially a theory 
of money at the level of the description of simple circulation' (Backhaus 1997, 94). In the past 
few years, Michael Heinrich, above all, has taken up the cudgels for Backhaus' thesis. 
3 With this complicated formulation, Marx is attempting to take account of the different theoretical levels at 
which he situates his concepts. Money's 'staying at home' refers to value's underdetermined autonomy in money. 
In order to achieve intertemporal existence, however, value must not only appear in the form of money, but must 
also make its 'entry into circulation'. From the fact that the value or, rather, money can exist only under capitalist 
relations of production, Michael Heinrich concludes that Marx's theory of value 'is not only a monetary theory of 
value, but is a theory of value only insofar as it is a theory of capital, since value acquires stability only through 
its movement as capital' (Heinrich 1999, 256).









































9Heinrich takes issue with the idea, still frequently encountered in the ongoing discussion of 
Marx's theory, that money is merely a formal translation of an immanent quantity of value:
[Money] is, rather, the necessary, and, above all, 'only possible form in which the value of a commodity can 
appear'. There can be no form in which value is manifested independently of exchange, for to admit this 
implies abolition of the difference between privately expended and socially recognized labour. (Heinrich 
1999, 242)
There is disagreement about whether and to what extent 'the monetary theory of value' 
designates a 'school' (Haug 2004c, 886), as it does in the estimation of the editor of the 
Historisch-kritisch Wörterbuch des Marxismus, Wolfgang Fritz Haug.
Haug takes a different position on money. In his view, 'value-based exchange' is, strictly 
speaking, impossible for Marx, 'even mediated by money' (ibid, 887). Moreover, money is 
by no means needed to express 'the value-character' of a commodity; it is not even needed 'to put 
commodities in general into relation with one another as values' .... Money is, however, needed, as is the 
realisation of the capital relation on a monetary basis, to put, more or less in general, the products of a society 
'into relation with one another as values'. (Haug 2004b, 886f.)
Haug criticizes the 'monetary theory of value' on the grounds that it aspires to 
'eliminate all relation to reality' (Haug 2004a, 705) by juggling with purely academic 
concepts. On his reading, which purports to map out a 'third position' between the logical and 
historical interpretations of Capital, it is a question, in Marx, of 'the development of concepts'. 
Yet this conceptual development has to move in step with the development of things 
themselves, and is therefore shaped by the way reality develops; it is a dialectic which Marx 
requires to 'acknowledge its limits' (ibid.). Problematic about Haug's efforts to stake out his 
'third position' is the fact that they do not rectify Engels' interpretation of simple commodity 
production, but merely attach a new label to it, one which identifies it as a 'genetic 
reconstruction'. Such a reconstruction is supposedly 'more faithful to Marx's conception of his 
own method' (Haug 2003, 426), because it reconstructs his way of presenting matters in 
'consistent historical-materialist fashion' (ibid.):
In Marx, the analysis of social structures, functions, and forms, together with the corresponding forms of 
praxis and struggle, always seeks to reconstitute their genesis – not, of course, in the historical-empirical 
sense of the word, but, as it were, under experimental conditions, by way of the model-like reconstitution of a 
developmental context protected against external interference. (Haug 2001, 264)
Thus while the historical is 'not identical with the "historical course of events"' (Haug 
2004a,   704),   Marx's   'presentation   nevertheless   proceeds   ...   by   way   of   analysis   and 









































9of the value-form' (Haug 1976, 114). It proves impossible to maintain a distinction between 
the position that Haug claims to reject (Engels' simple commodity production) and Haug's 
own position, presented as 'praxiological', 'genetic-reconstructive', and so on. The congruence 
of the two positions is further illustrated by the political conclusion Haug draws from his 
theoretical labours – a conclusion that smacks of Engelsianism and evokes one imputed to 
Marx: 'An important means of achieving socialism and, at the same time, an important 
objective of socialism is, according to Marx, the establishment of equality of labour for all the 
members of society who are capable of working–in other words, the generality of labour.' 
(Ibid., 119)
Over against these theoretically and politically dubious conclusions, the scholars 
whom Haug deprecates as 'monetarists' have, thanks to the publication of the second edition 
of the MEGA from 1975 on, been able to cite many texts and manuscripts that tend to confirm 
their conclusions.
There can, of course, be no such confirmation without philology. Whence the task that 
Hoff's book sets itself. As Hoff remarks in the introduction,
studies that examine the history of Marx's reception of his sources in light of the emerging critique of 
political economy can help counter dogmatic receptions of Marx's own work. A conception of the critique of 
political economy as an open-ended project (one that takes into account the different degrees to which 
individual manuscripts or individual sections of them have been worked out), an insistence on the historicity 
of this critique in the context of the sources for each text, and a consideration of the uses to which Marx puts 
these sources, can serve as an alternative (especially where what is involved lies goes beyond Marxology 
narrowly conceived) to the still dominant canonisation, by no means motivated on compelling political 
grounds, of (certain parts of) certain texts, to the practice of prising such texts from their context in the 
overall development of Marx's work, and, finally, to the neglect of Marx's source texts and his handling of 
them (p. 12).
It should be added that, defending the view that philology is not 'an end in itself' (p. 
12), Hoff confronts the danger that we began by noting. His work will here be measured by 
the goals it sets itself.
Hoff first reviews current research on the Marxian critique of political economy, quite 
rightly noting that Marx's critique is distinguished by its break with the empiricism of 
classical political economy. Then, after briefly presenting the work of Hans-Georg Backhaus 
and Helmut Reichelt, he turns to the problematic sketched above, tracing the autonomisation 
of exchange value in the form of money and capital:
The category of money results from the fact that the general characteristics of value (according to Backhaus 









































9forms) require a form independent of the immediate material body of the commodity. The development of 
categories as a development of contradictions is adumbrated here. With the commodity-money structure, the 
contradiction is not eliminated, but sublated. It might be added that not only money, but all other forms of 
value should be understood as forms of existence of the general character of value, forms that stand in 
contradiction with their material existence in each of the forms value takes. (p. 23)
By requiring that the critique of political economy show every economic category to 
be a form comprising one moment in an overarching totality, Backhaus and Reichelt take a 
step toward rescuing Marx's methods and concepts from the vulgarisation that has been their 
lot. Hoff demonstrates this, using the example of the substance of value. He contends that 
abstract labour is an ambiguous totalising category. In the analysis of the value-form in 
Capital Volume I, it is conceived as the generalized labour corresponding to the domination 
of   exchange-value   (der   Wertgeltung).   Elsewhere,   especially   in   the  Grundrisse,   it   is 
understood as abstract labour in actu, that is to say, as a use-value standing over against 
capital. With this as his point of departure, Hoff could have constructed a political argument 
about the relationship between labour and capital, or, more precisely, about its logical status 
within the overall architecture of Marx's theory. But he does not strike down this path. That, 
together with the fact that he does not make the political stake of the conceptual transition 
from money to capital explicit, sows the first doubts about his claim that his study of Marx is 
not an exercise in philology for philology's sake. For, in the best of cases, it is questionable 
whether there is anything to be gained, theoretically speaking, from a concept of abstract 
labour that treats it, not as the counterpart of value (Wertgeltung), but an ambiguous totalising 
category. Thus abstract labour  in actu  appears to be, rather, concrete labour under the 
constraints of the profit drive, as Hoff himself notes (cf. p. 30).
Our doubts are strengthened by Hoff's examination of Marx's reading of Aristotle's 
analysis of value. Thus it may be of some interest to know that Marx first considered 
Aristotle's treatment of value in the rough draft of the Grundrisse. However, it borders on 
pedantry to go to elaborate lengths to show that, in the excerpts he made before producing 
these fragments, Marx, in his discussions of Aristotle, never mentions his analysis of the form 
of value (cf. pp. 34f.). As for the concrete examination of Marx's reception of Aristotle's 
analysis of value, it yields curiously divergent results. One is banal: namely, that the passage 
on the Aristotelian analysis of value in the appendix to the first edition of  Capital, the 
wording and systematic placement of which is nearly identical to that of the passage 
incorporated into the text proper in the second edition, 'probably' has 'less a systematic role 









































9observation that there are two different conceptions of simple circulation in Marx is powerful. 
Thus he points out that simple circulation is, on the one hand, a 'derivative, abstract sphere of 
capitalist relations of production' (p. 38), and, on the other, the historical possibility of a form 
of production not governed by exchange value. It follows that Aristotle's analysis of value 'by 
no means founders because its object was not yet sufficiently developed in the real world':
Commodity and monetary exchange was, in Aristotle's day, 'objective economic reality'. The same holds, 
then, for the typical inversion of the expression of value that occurs in this process: the fact that the concrete 
labour objectified in the materiality of the money commodity counts as a form of manifestation of universal 
abstract labour, just as all other concrete labour objectified in the materiality of a commodity is inverted to 
become a particular form of manifestation of universal abstract labour. (p. 39)
Hoff has, however, passed up the chance to elaborate political-theoretical criteria at 
the beginning of his book – for example, a conception of the critique of political economy 
suggested by the considerations just mentioned, one based, at the theoretical level, on an 
awareness of the precariousness of Marx's intellectual progress and firmly opposed, at the 
political level, to 'the whole shit' (Marx 1975, vol. 40: 20, letter to Engels of 30 April 1868). 
of capital and the market. The result is that Hoff's philological findings do not lead on to the 
obvious critique of Marx's own inconsistencies. Yet the claim that Aristotle was unable to 
discover the unity of commodities in their exchange value because he was an ancient Greek 
(cf. MEGA² II.5, 636) quite simply reflects a dogmatic conception of historical materialism 
that   Marx   himself   reads   out   of   court   in   his   subtler   reflections   on   historical   non-
contemporaneity.
5 This is the more serious in that Hoff does not even measure up to his own 
ambition   to   combat   dogmatism   and   the   canonisation   of   certain   texts   by   putting   his 
conclusions to work in a concrete critique of traditional Marxism's articles of faith. Thus he 
does not, after nicely pointing up the ambiguity of the concept of simple circulation, bring his 
insight to bear on the substantialist conceptions of value that underpin Engels' notion of 
'simple commodity production' (cf. Engels 1975, vol. 37 and Heinrich 1999, 214ff.).
The reconstitution of the various stages of Marx's reception of Petty that follows 
Hoff's chapter on Aristotle once again demonstrates how vital it is that a philological 
examination of Marx's texts be informed by theoretical and political criteria. To be sure, Hoff 
shows that Marx's estimation of Petty changed significantly over a twenty-five year period: 
once just 'a seventeenth-century writer' (1851), Petty eventually rose to the rank of 'a brilliant 
and original economic writer' (1877). But the reasons for this reassessment – Marx ascribes to 
5 See, for example, the considerations on the general rate of profit and commercial capital in Capital, Vol. 3 









































9Petty a 'presentiment of the nature of surplus value' (MEGA² II.3.2., 504) – were problematic, 
as Hoff ought to have pointed out. For, given Petty's mercantilist perspective and essentially 
quantitative theoretical approach, it is doubtful whether he can be said to have contributed 
anything to the labour theory of value. Hoff tries to explain Marx's tendency to overestimate 
Petty by evoking his reflections on 'the historicity of Petty's theoretical accomplishments' (p. 
54), but the result is rather unconvincing. His study of Marx's reception of Petty thus offers 
us, in the end, rather slim pickings:
Marx's evaluation of Petty's economic work has its own history, which is bound up with the history of the 
origins and development of the critique of political economy (qua theoretical reconstruction and critique of 
the overall system of economic categories as well as the critique of all earlier economic science). (p. 55)
We already have the first half of Hoff's book behind us, and good reason to doubt that 
the author will, in the second, produce much more than Marxist philology. But the two 
chapters that make up the second half of the book hold a surprise in store, because their 
critique of Marx's reception of Smith and Ricardo is based on the theoretical criterion of the 
monetary theory of value – which Hoff invokes at the beginning of his monograph, but first 
brings into play only here:
Marx reads Smith. . . as if Smith makes the measure of value under pre-capitalist conditions the labour 
expended on one's own commodity, and, under capitalist conditions, the 'commanded labour' of others. For 
Smith, however, what determines the magnitude of value under capitalist conditions is no longer the amount 
of one's own labour required to produce it, but, rather, 'labour commanded', the quantity of labour obtained 
from others in exchange for a determinate quantity of commodities. (p. 56f.)
Moreover,  Marx is said to use Smith's thinking on the origins of money, which 
proceeds from a pre-monetary theory of value, as an argument for a monetary theory of value:
In the  Grundrisse, Marx insists that money is an essential, indispensable moment in the process of 
commodity exchange. For Smith, on the other hand, there is no essential difference between barter and 
monetary exchange. Smith says nothing about the specific necessity for the increasingly form-bound nature 
of the object of exchange. Although Marx argues, as early as the Grundrisse, that the exchange process 
should not be conceived as it is by Smith, who draws no principled distinction between monetary exchange 
and the exchange of two goods whose form is indifferent (barter), he nevertheless fails explicitly to state the 
difference separating him from Smith on this decisive point. (p. 59f.)
Despite the distance that his interpretive criteria allow him to take from Marx's text, 
Hoff persists, to a certain extent, in hiding behind his philological findings. As a result, the 
concrete interpretation of Marx's economic critique as a monetary theory of value does not 









































9contribution that has achieved a certain predominance over other interpretations (such as 
Engels' 'simple commodity production'). The blindness brought on by 'love of the word' 
blocks the insight that interpretations are not only sustained by texts, but must also carry the 
day against competing 'conceptual systems' (dispositifs) (Sève 2004, 114).
In Hoff's view, Marx argues the unity of the theory of value and the theory of money 
even more powerfully by way of his critique of Ricardo. In the process, he goes beyond the 
Ricardian distinction between relative and absolute value, inasmuch as he conceives of 
absolute value as 'the dimension of the relationality of a commodity to the total mass of 
commodities' (p. 76). Yet, Hoff says, inconsistencies continue to plague the way Marx reads 
this pair of concepts itself:
For [Marx] himself, the utilisation of the pair of concepts 'absolute-relative' comes to be firmly bound up 
with the fact that, first, relative value is value expressed in the physical form of another commodity, and, 
second, absolute value constitutes the dimension in which commodities are qualitatively identical as 
objectifications of abstract universal labour. For Ricardo, in contrast, the distinction between relative and 
absolute value resides in the fact that absolute value is measured by an invariable (external) measure of 
value–something that, from Ricardo's standpoint, cannot exist. (p. 79)
An explicit theoretical discussion of the standpoint of the monetary theory of value is 
also lacking in Hoff's discussion of Marx's reading of Ricardo, and we find no trace of 
anything resembling a political discussion. Yet Hoff's study would have gained much from an 
explicit discussion of theoretical premises: the Marxist critique of political economy sets out 
from the necessary unity of the processes of production and exchange. We have already noted 
that money is the 'only possible form in which the value of a commodity can appear' (Heinrich 
1999, 242). On this subject, Michael Heinrich aptly points out that
since, before exchange takes place, it is not possible to talk about a definite quantity of value, money as a 
measure of value does more than simply provide a formal translation of an immanent quantity of value that 
the magnitude of value has already measured. Money is, rather, the necessary and, above all, the  only 
possible form in which the value of a commodity can appear. The value of a commodity cannot appear in a 
form independent of exchange: the existence of such a form would imply abolition of the difference between 
privately expended labour and socially acknowledged labour. (Ibid.)
A cohesive capitalist social order and the intertemporality of value are guaranteed only 
by the existence of money. Moreover, as has already been observed with respect to the 
conceptual transition from money to capital, every theoretical approach has a political 
dimension. Thus, in his day, Marx's monetary theory of value set him apart from various other 









































9production would continue, but money would be abolished or replaced by coupons or 'time 
tickets' attesting the amount of labour performed by the holder. Thus we find fresh 
confirmation of the plausibility of the conception of the critique of political economy 
defended here. This conception takes theoretical progress to be precarious – as Hoff himself 
points out, Marx is initially uncertain about the monetary character of his theory of value – 
while radically rejecting the forms engendered by capitalism: money is as much a part of 'the 
whole shit' as are markets and capital.
Here, too, lies the political significance of the monetary theory of value. Its radical 
analysis of form clearly brings out the connection between the various moments of capitalism; 
in so doing, it arms itself against half-baked emancipatory schemes that take for granted the 
continuing existence of commodities, money or exchange even in postcapitalist societies. By 
bringing such interconnections to the fore, it simultaneously renders itself immune to the 
questionable critique of capitalism that turns, for instance, on the – currently fashionable – 
opposition between 'speculative' financial markets and 'solid' capitalist production. At the 
same time, the monetary theory of value breaks with obsolete 'truths' of the workers' 
movement, such as the assumption that, for reasons rooted in a philosophy of history, 
revolution is ineluctable. That this revision of Marxism does not spill directly over into 
agitation outside factory gates is, perhaps, the price to pay for adopting such a theoretically 
radical stance. In any event, the critical social theory of the twenty-first century will have to 
find other ways to make itself heard.
The fact that there is no concluding chapter to Hoff's book, like the absence of 
political-theoretical criteria, leads us back to the question of what is gained by his philology. 
Against it, let us hold out an idea developed in Frieder Otto Wolf 's preface to the book:
As the reading public gains access, step by step, to literally all the written traces of the unfinished and, 
basically, interrupted work of the scientific revolution to which Marx devoted the greater part of his life, an 
illusion is crumbling: namely, the notion that we can derive from such – altogether indispensable – 
philological labour by itself an adequate theoretical base on which to pursue Marx's scientific revolution in 
our own day. (p. 9)
Indispensable, but inadequate: the material wealth of Hoff's study has to be framed by 
a political-theoretical critique that he has yet to produce. Only when he does will his 
philology cease to be an end in itself, taking its place as a contribution to the 'class struggle in 
the field of theory' (Althusser 1984, 67). For the use value of philological studies of Marx is 
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